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Abstract—Due to the advanced capabilities of the Internet
of Vehicles (IoV) components such as vehicles, Roadside Units
(RSUs) and smart devices as well as the increasing amount of
data generated, Federated Learning (FL) becomes a promising
tool given that it enables privacy-preserving machine learning
that can be implemented in the IoV. However, the performance
of the FL suffers from the failure of communication links and
missing nodes, especially when continuous exchanges of model
parameters are required. Therefore, we propose the use of Un-
manned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as wireless relays to facilitate the
communications between the IoV components and the FL server
and thus improving the accuracy of the FL. However, a single
UAV may not have sufficient resources to provide services for all
iterations of the FL process. In this paper, we present a joint
auction-coalition formation framework to solve the allocation of
UAV coalitions to groups of IoV components. Specifically, the
coalition formation game is formulated to maximize the sum
of individual profits of the UAVs. The joint auction-coalition
formation algorithm is proposed to achieve a stable partition
of UAV coalitions in which an auction scheme is applied to
solve the allocation of UAV coalitions. The auction scheme is
designed to take into account the preferences of IoV components
over heterogeneous UAVs. The simulation results show that
the grand coalition, where all UAVs join a single coalition, is
not always stable due to the profit-maximizing behavior of the
UAVs. In addition, we show that as the cooperation cost of the
UAVs increases, the UAVs prefer to support the IoV components
independently and not to form any coalition.
Index Terms—Federated Learning, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,
Coalition, Auction, Internet of Vehicles
I. INTRODUCTION
It is expected by 2023, the Internet of Things (IoT) will
have a market size of $1.1 trillion [1]. With an increasing
number of vehicles being connected to the IoT, instead of just
providing information to the drivers and uploading the sensor
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data to the Internet, from which other users can access the data,
the vehicles are connected to each other in a network such
that they are able to exchange their sensor data among each
other for the optimization of a well-defined utility function.
As a result, the deep integration between IoT and vehicular
networks has led to the evolution of the Internet of Vehicles
(IoV) [2] from the traditional Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks
(VANETs).
IoV is an open and integrated network with communication,
computation, intelligence, storage and learning capabilities.
Different from VANETs of which the performance is con-
strained by the number of vehicles connected to the networks
and the mobility of the vehicles, the emphasis of the IoV
network on information interaction among users, vehicles
and Roadside Units (RSUs) has enabled many transportation-
related applications that improve the efficiency of the trans-
portation systems, upgrade the service level of the cities and
provide comfort and higher satisfaction to the drivers. The
mobile crowd sensing paradigm can make use of the sensor-
equipped vehicles, the RSUs as well as the mobile devices
in the IoV network to produce useful traffic data that is
transmitted to the cloud for analysis. The collection and the
analysis of the crowd-sourced data allow us to gain meaningful
insights for the provision of efficient traffic management [3],
route planning [4] as well as to promote safe driving [5].
Given the enormous amounts of dynamic data generated
in the IoV network, Artificial Intelligence technologies are
leveraged to build data-driven models. Specifically, many ma-
chine learning algorithms are developed to process and analyze
data in order to make smart traffic predictions and provide
intelligent route recommendations. To build the data-driven
models, the traditional machine learning approaches require
the data to be transmitted to the central data server for training.
As the number of components connected to the IoV network
increases, the amount of data generated in the IoV network
increases exponentially. The central data server does not have
sufficient storage and computing resources to store and process
such massive amount of data, limiting the performance of the
trained models. Besides that, the transmission of raw data over
the communication channels incurs high communication cost
and risks the privacy of the data as it may be eavesdropped
while being transmitted.
In face of these challenges, Federated Learning (FL) [6]
has gained great interest of the research and industrial com-
munities. Instead of training the machine learning model at
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
06
37
8v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 13
 Ju
l 2
02
0
2the central data server, FL allows the training of the models to
take place directly on the devices by leveraging on the growing
computational and storage capabilities of the IoT devices.
The IoV service provider runs an FL server, i.e., model
owner, which employs multiple groups of parking vehicles
or RSUs, i.e., workers, which collect information from their
immediate surroundings. In each training iteration, the workers
receive the model parameters from the model owner for model
training on their respective local datasets. The updated local
model parameters from all involved workers are then uploaded
to the FL server which performs model aggregation. The
model owner then transmits the updated model parameters
to the workers for another iteration of local model training.
A number of iterations is performed until a desired accuracy
is achieved. Efficient data-driven models are built while pre-
serving the privacy of the participating devices since only the
model parameters, rather than the raw data, are exchanged.
However, there are several challenges pertaining to FL
specifically that need to be addressed for large scale implemen-
tation of efficient FL. In particular, communication inefficiency
is a key bottleneck in the FL process [7]. Since the federated
network is connected to millions of devices, it is estimated
that the time taken to update the local parameters over the
communication channels takes longer than to compute the
local parameters themselves. The data communication between
the workers and the model owner may fail due to limited com-
munication capacity and link failure [8], [9], which leads to
the resulting node failure and missing node information. More
than 30% of node failure contributes to a significant increase of
the average end-to-end delay and concurrent communication
time [10]. This means that the number of workers participating
in the model training is reduced due to communication failure,
thus causing a lower accuracy of the FL model.
Therefore, we propose the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) to facilitate the network in achieving higher commu-
nication efficiency in the FL network.
The vehicles and the RSUs may not have sufficient com-
munication bandwidth and energy capacity to transmit the
local model parameters directly to the FL server which is
located far away. As a result, the FL server does not receive
the local model parameters from these failing nodes, which
cause a degraded performance in the trained FL model. The
UAVs are increasingly used as relays between the ground base
terminals and the network base station [11] to improve network
connectivity and extend coverage areas [12]. Since UAVs can
be quickly deployed to designated areas whenever they are
needed, the UAVs are nearer to the vehicles and the RSUs.
Instead of transmitting the local model parameters to the FL
server that is further away, the vehicles and the RSUs only
need to transmit them to the UAVs that are located nearer to
them, of which the parameters are relayed to the FL server.
Hence, as compared to the direct communication between
the IoV components and the FL server, the UAVs help to
improve this communication by reducing node failures which
may be due to limited resources and energy capacity of the
IoV components.
In this paper, we consider that the model owner is interested
in facilitating FL among IoV components (Fig. 1), e.g., for
Cloud server
Aggregated model
Coalition A
Coalition B Local
model
Local
model
Aggregated
model
RSU
Fig. 1. System model consists of the cloud server (FL model owner), the
vehicles and RSUs (selected FL workers) and the UAVs.
traffic prediction. For efficient FL training, the model owner
announces the FL task and the number of training iterations.
The interested workers upload their sampling rate to the model
owner. The model owner then selects its workers accordingly
based on the importance of each worker, which is computed
based on the uploaded sampling rates. Since the workers may
not have sufficient resources, i.e., transmission power and
communication bandwidth for efficient FL, the workers can
utilize UAVs which have the required resources to facilitate
the FL tasks. Firstly, the workers will conduct model training
with their local datasets. Then, instead of sending the local
model parameters to the remote FL server directly, the workers
upload their local model parameters to the UAVs, which in
turn aggregate the accumulated model parameters for relay to
the model owner. Thereafter, the model owner aggregates the
model parameters to derive the global FL model. The model
owner will then announce the global FL model parameters to
the workers for another round of FL training. The process
continues until the number of iterations announced by the
model owner is reached.
There are two advantages to this proposed approach. Firstly,
the privacy of the workers is preserved since only local
parameters of the workers are exchanged with the UAVs and
the data of the workers remains locally at the workers’ site.
Secondly, with the help of UAVs, communication efficiency is
increased, resulting in reduction of link and node failure.
However, a single UAV may not have sufficient energy to
last for the entire training duration and other resources for
the FL training process. As such, the UAVs may cooperate
with other UAVs to ensure that the edge aggregation and
communications with the model owner are provided through-
out the entire FL training process. To model the cooperation
among the UAVs, we propose a coalition formation approach
among cooperating UAVs. In order to incentivize UAVs to
participate in the FL training, the UAVs are rewarded for
their contributions if they complete the FL training process.
The UAVs receive different payoffs for supporting FL training
process for different cells of workers as the importance of
the workers varies. In addition, the workers have preference
for different UAVs. In order to elicit the valuations of cells
of workers for each coalition of profit-maximizing UAVs,
we propose an auction scheme. Each cell of workers submit
3their bids to each coalition of UAVs. Collectively, the profit-
maximizing UAVs evaluate all possible coalitional structure
formation and decide on the optimal allocation of UAVs. Since
the UAVs are profit-maximizing, it is possible that there are
two or more UAV coalitions which want to be allocated to the
same cell of workers. In such a situation, based on the bids of
the cells of workers, which also represent preferences of the
cells of workers, the more preferred UAV coalition gets the
allocation.
The main goal of this work is to develop a joint auction-
coalition formation framework of UAVs towards enabling
efficient FL for IoV networks. The integration of coalition
formations of UAVs and optimal bidding of cells of workers
makes the proposed framework suitable for the FL training
process as it ensures that the UAVs have sufficient resources to
complete the FL tasks and at the same time, optimally allocates
the profit-maximizing UAV coalitions to the groups of IoV
components. Our key contributions include:
1) We propose the introduction of UAVs as wireless relays
in FL network where communication efficiency between
the model owner and the workers is improved.
2) We propose a joint auction-coalition formation frame-
work where the problem of UAV coalitions allocation
to the groups of IoVs components is formulated as a
coalition formation game.
3) We propose a joint auction-coalition formation algorithm
where a stable coalitional structure is achieved in which
the allocation of profit-maximizing UAV coalitions to
the groups of IoV components is solved by an auction
scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, we review the related works. In Section III,
we present the system model and the problem formulation.
Our proposed approach of coalition formation of UAVs and
auction design are discussed in Section IV and Section V,
respectively. Section VI discusses the simulation results and
analysis. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A number of recent studies investigate on the effective de-
ployment of FL algorithms over the wireless networks. Several
fundamental issues such as the optimal allocation of resources
[13], [14], the development of efficient algorithms [15] and the
design of incentive mechanisms [16], [17] are current active
research areas in FL. One of the main challenges in FL is
communication inefficiency. In particular, the synchronous FL
protocol implies that each training iteration only takes place
as quickly as the slowest device, i.e., the straggler’s effect
[18]. As such, the dropped or straggling devices can lower the
efficiency of FL training. The reduction of communication cost
in the federated network setting can be achieved by reducing
the total number of communication iterations or by reducing
the size of transmitted data in each iteration [19]. In order to
minimize convergence time while optimizing performance, the
study of [20] looks into probabilistic user selection scheme
and artificial neural networks. Given the faster convergence
time, the end devices have greater capabilities to complete
the FL training process. The study of [7] proposes to use
structured and sketched updates to reduce communication cost
in dealing with a large number of users over unreliable network
connections.
Apart from the studies that focus on the improvement of
transmission efficiency in the wireless networks [21], [22],
due to the inherent attributes of UAVs such as flexibility,
mobility and adaptive altitude, there are an increasing number
of UAV applications in wireless networks [23]. The growing
capabilities of the UAVs have demonstrated their potential
to be deployed in numerous applications, e.g., environmen-
tal sensing [24], mobile edge computing [25] and traffic
surveillance [26]. In particular, UAVs are also increasingly
being considered in IoV-related applications for more efficient
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) in the development of
smart cities. The study of [27] provides a solution in counting
the number of cars based on images provided by the UAVs.
The aerial images taken by the UAVs are used to track vehicles
[28]. Moreover, UAVs are also used as aerial mobile base
station for cellular traffic offloading [29]. Several studies such
as [30] have been conducted on the optimal placement of the
UAVs.
However, to the best of our knowledge, few studies consider
using UAVs for efficient FL. The involvement of UAVs as
wireless relays between the IoV components and the FL server
can greatly improve the communication efficiency of the FL
training process by improving the connectivity and increasing
the coverage of the IoV components.
Due to the limitation of a single UAV in carrying out
complex tasks, coalition formation games for tasks allocation
have been investigated. The cooperation of multiple UAVs
to maximize the coverage utility of the UAV network is
considered in [31], which is useful in crowdsensing tasks
to gather more data covering larger areas for more accurate
analysis. A leader-follower approach [32] is also widely used
by the UAVs to form multiple coalitions in order to com-
plete designated tasks with minimal resources. The study in
[33] considers coalition formations for tasks allocation taking
into account tasks priority and requiring the UAVs to arrive
simultaneously for task completion. However, these coalition
formations approaches do not jointly consider the importance
of the tasks that the UAVs perform and the optimal allocation
of the UAVs to complete the tasks, subject to the resource
constraints of the UAVs. Besides that, the preferences of the
workers for heterogeneous UAVs are not considered.
To that end, in order to elicit the preferences of workers for
the heterogeneous UAVs, we adopt an auction-based approach
in our coalition formation design for task allocation. The use of
sequential auction mechanism is proposed [34] by considering
the UAVs with limited communication range. However, it only
considers one UAV in serving a task, whereas a single UAV
may not be able to support a cell of workers for the entire FL
training process in our model. The study of [35] explores the
leader-follower approach where the leader UAVs auction for
other UAVs to form coalitions that are adaptive to the changes
in task workload and capabilities of the UAVs. The work
of [36] proposes a multi-layered cost computation method to
calculate the price of the bid. While the study of auction design
4is well-explored in tasks allocation, where the bid winner is
often determined by the bid with lowest cost or the bid with
the highest utility, the valuation of a coalitional structure using
an auction approach is often not considered.
As such, this inspires us to propose a joint auction-coalition
formation framework (Fig. 2) to determine the allocation of
UAV coalitions to groups of IoV components for efficient FL
over IoV networks.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a UAV-assisted FL network over the IoV
paradigm. The system model is comprised of an FL model
owner which announces crowdsensing tasks to a group of
selected FL workers. The FL workers which complete the
crowdsensing tasks are responsible for labelling the data and
training the model on their own local datasets. In order to
perform data labelling for model training, the FL workers
can leverage the knowledge, i.e., labels from a source-domain
party [37]. Thereafter, the local model parameters will be
uploaded to the FL model owner for model aggregation. Since
the communication efficiency between the model owner and
the cell of workers is low due to link failure and missing
nodes [8], [9], UAVs are introduced to facilitate the network
to improve the communication efficiency of the FL model.
We consider a coverage area that is divided into I cells,
represented by a set I = {1, . . . , i, . . . , I}. Each cell i contains
Wi workers, where the total number of workers in each cell i is
different and it is represented by Wi = {1, . . . , wi, . . . ,Wi}.
The term diw denotes the wth IoV component in cell i. Each
worker has different levels of importance, denoted by σiw, e.g.,
based on the sampling rate and the quality of data collected.
The workers with low sampling rate and low quality are of
low importance as there is insufficient data for the FL training
process. The workers upload their sampling rates to the model
owner, which in turn computes the importance of each worker.
Since the design for incentive mechanisms that guarantee the
truthfulness of the workers’ sampling rates is not the focus of
this paper, existing incentive mechanisms such as the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism [38] can be implemented to ensure
that the workers upload their true sampling rates. Based on
the importance level of each worker, the model owner selects
the workers to participate in the FL training process. After
selecting the workers, the model owner announces an FL
model that will be trained over µ iterations. The optimal
value of µ is determined such that the global loss function is
minimized given the resource-constrained workers [15]. Upon
completion of the FL task, the model owner will make a
payment to the participating workers.
In the network, there are M geographically distributed
UAVs, represented by a set M = {1, . . . ,m, . . . ,M} to
facilitate the FL training process. The UAVs only collect
the local model parameters from the individual workers after
their model training and then perform edge aggregation before
transmitting the aggregated local model parameters to the FL
model owner. This ensures that the data belonging to the
workers is not exchanged with any third parties, consequently
preserving the data privacy. To improve communication ef-
ficiency, the UAVs need to ensure that they have sufficient
TABLE I
TABLE OF COMMONLY USED NOTATIONS.
Parameter Description
Worker Parameters
Wi Total Number of Workers
siw Sampling Rate of Worker
σiw Importance of Worker
Cell Parameters
I Total Number of Cells
σi Importance of Cell
qi Price Coefficient of Importance of Cell
UAVs Parameters
M Total Number of UAVs
dmi Distance between UAV and cell
Em Energy Capacity
Km Cooperation Cost
δm Price Coefficient of Energy Cost of UAV
nim Maximum Number of Iterations of UAV
Coalitions Parameters
Sl Coalition of UAVs
θ1, θ2 Weight Parameters
αi(Sl) True Valuation
xi(Sl) Profit of Coalition
pi(Sl) Cost of Coalition
ci(Sl) Payment Price of Bid Winner
γ(Π) Profit of Partition
Model Owner Parameters
µ Number of FL Iterations
energy to stay in the air throughout the entire FL process.
In order to incentivise the UAVs to complete the FL training
process, the workers will make a payment to the UAVs. In
fact, the UAVs always maximize their payoffs. However, the
individual UAVs may lack the energy capacities to stay in the
air throughout the entire FL training process, and they cannot
support certain cells of workers. As a result, the UAVs can
consider to form coalitions. Note that each coalition of UAVs
can only choose to facilitate the FL training process in one
of the cells of workers. In order to elicit the willingness of
payment of each cell of workers, an auction scheme is also
explored to investigate the optimal allocation that maximizes
the profits of the UAVs. To perform the auction process, the
UAVs and the workers keep each other informed of their
locations.
In our system model, we consider the use of UAVs to facil-
itate the FL training process by improving the communication
efficiency between the FL workers and the FL model owner.
At the same time, the UAVs can be used to support other
types of users such as the typical mobile users, which generate
background traffic for the UAVs. An extension to our system
model to include different types of users, is straightforward
and can be considered in the future work. Note that with
greater computational and communication capabilities to sup-
port more IoV components for the training of FL models with
higher accuracy level, the operational cost of involving the
UAVs in the model training may be higher than that without
using the UAVs.
A. Worker Selection
Each worker has different sensing capabilities and has
different types of collected data. As such, the quality of
data collected by each worker differs from one another. For
example, a higher quality sensor provides data that more
51. Selection of Workers 2. Auction-Coalition Framework
A. Coalition Formations of UAVs
B. Bid Valuation of Groups of Workers
C. Cost Evaluation of UAVs
D. Allocation of UAVs to Groups of Workers
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Cell 1 Bid
Cell 2 Bid
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Cell 3 Profit
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complete a number of 
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model owner Model owner selects workers
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training process and complete 
remaining number of iterations
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UAV 1
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UAV 3
Summation of Cost Incurred
Cell 2 Cell 3Cell 1
Competition
D-1
D-3
Allocated to Cell 3 as Cell 
3 submits higher bid
D-2
D-4
D-5
A
B
C-3
Allocated 
to Cell 1
C-1
C-2
Allocated to Cell 2 
A
B
CD
Allocation
Upload Sampling 
Rate
Workers’ Selection
Bids Submission
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Vehicle
RSU
Competition
*Note: The cost evaluation shown is only for one UAV coalition to a cell of 
workers. Cost evaluation needs to be done for all submitted bids.
Fig. 2. Illustration of the Joint Auction-Coalition Formation Framework.
accurately reflects the changes in the road traffic environment.
Reference [39] considers the quality of data collected as a
function of the sampling rate. The quality of data implies the
importance of the workers where a worker with higher quality
of data has higher importance, such that the model accuracy
can be improved. Following a similar assumption as in [39],
the importance of worker w in cell i is denoted by
σiw(siw) =
log10(siw + 1)
log10 20
, (1)
where siw is the sampling rate of a specific worker denoted by
diw. This concave function implies that the increase in sam-
pling rate at lower values has a greater impact on the quality
of worker as compared to the same increase in sampling rate
at higher values. The log term in Equation (1) captures the
effect of diminishing marginal rate of return on the sampling
rate as the data may be replicated or similar and thus, they are
redundant [40].
The model owner selects workers which has an importance
level greater than ζ, where ζ is the minimum threshold level
of importance for the workers to be selected by the model
owner. The value of ζ is determined by the model owner and
is IoV application-specific. For example, ζ can be set larger
for road safety applications such as navigation systems.
The importance of cell i can be computed as a summation
of individual importance of each selected worker in cell i. It
can be expressed as:
σi =
Wi∑
w=1
σiw, (2)
where σiw denotes the importance of worker diw.
B. UAV Energy Model
To execute the FL model training, each UAV incurs trav-
elling cost to the workers’ locations, communication and
computational costs. It also incurs coalition formation cost that
includes cooperation and coordination cost if a UAV decides
to join a coalition. The energy spent by the UAV in executing
the task includes the following components:
• flying from its original position to the destination and
flying back to its original position,
• receiving local model parameters from the workers,
• staying at the destination to aggregate the local parame-
ters from the workers,
• transmitting aggregated local model parameters to the
model owner,
• receiving global model parameters from the model owner,
• transmitting global model parameters to the workers,
• receiving aggregated local model parameters from the
workers, and
• communicating with other UAVs to form a coalition.
1) Flying Energy: Following a similar assumption as in
[41], the energy required by the UAV m to fly from its depot
to cell i can be denoted by efi,m, where
efi,m =
(
1
2
gfi +
1
2
gfm
)
ef
dmi
v
. (3)
Without loss of generality, the UAVs are assumed to fly at
a constant velocity v. The energy required to make a flight
6per unit time is denoted as ef . We leverage gfi and g
f
m to
denote the flying energy weight in cell i and the depot of
UAV m, respectively. The flying energy weights depend on
the terrain of the cells and the depot of the UAV while dmi
reflects the distance between UAV m and cell i. Note that the
flying energy consumption, efi,m depends on both the locations
of the UAV and the cell.
2) Computational Energy: Similar to [42], the energy
needed by UAV m to complete the computation task per
iteration, which is to aggregate the local model parameters
of all workers, is represented as follows:
ecm = κamf
2
m, (4)
where am is the total number of CPU cycles needed by UAV
m to complete the aggregation of local model parameters, fm
is the computation capability of UAV m which depends on
the clock frequency of central processing unit (CPU) of UAV
m, κ is the coefficient of the value that depends on the circuit
architecture of CPUs as in [43].
3) Communication Energy: The UAV requires energy
to transmit data packets to the model owner. As in [13],
the achievable uplink transmission rate by UAV m can be
represented by
rUTm =
R∑
n=1
rmnbm log2(1 +
pmthm
In + bmN0
), (5)
where R is the total number of resource blocks that the model
owner allocates to the UAVs. Each UAV m is only allowed to
occupy one resource block. The term rmn is a resource block
vector, where rmn = {rm1, . . . , rmn, . . . , rmR}. In particular,
rmn = 1 indicates that resource block n is allocated to UAV
m, whereas rmn = 0 represents that the resource is not
allocated to UAV m. The term bm is the bandwidth allocated
to UAV m, pmt is the transmission power of UAV m, hm
is the channel gain between UAV m and the model owner,
In is the interference caused by other UAVs that uses the
same resource block and N0 is the power spectral density
of the Gaussian noise. The issues of optimal resource block
allocation, bandwidth allocation and transmission power allo-
cation have been extensively studied in the literature [44], [45].
Since it is not the focus of this paper, existing highly efficient
schemes such as an opportunistic and efficient resource block
allocation (OEA) algorithm [44] can be applied to determine
the allocation of resource blocks, bandwidth and transmission
powers of the UAVs. The energy required by UAV m to
transmit model parameters in any cell i to the model owner
over wireless channels per iteration is
eUTm = pmt
zc
rUTm
, (6)
where zc is the data size of cell-aggregated local model
parameters. To upload the data packet of size zc over time
t, the data size that UAV m can handle must be larger than
the input data size zc.
The UAV also requires energy to receive the global FL pa-
rameters from the model owner. Similar to [13], the achievable
downlink transmission rate by the FL server to UAV m is
rDRm = bBS log2(1 +
hmpBS
N0bBS
). (7)
The term of bBS is the bandwidth that the model owner
uses to broadcast information to the UAVs and pBS is the
transmission power of the model owner. The energy required
by UAV m to receive data from the model owner over wireless
channels per iteration is
eDRm = pmr
zBS
rDRm
, (8)
where pmr is the receiving power of UAV m. The term zBS
is the size of the global model parameters.
Similarly, energy is also needed by the UAVs to commu-
nicate with the workers in the cell. The achievable uplink
transmission rate by worker w in cell i is
rURiw =
R′i∑
n′=1
riwnbiw log2(1 +
piwhiw
In′ + biwN0
), (9)
where R′i is the total number of resource blocks allocated
to worker w in cell i, riwn′ is a resource block vector
where riwn′ = {riw1, . . . , riwn′ , . . . , riwR′}. The bandwidth
allocated to and transmission power of worker w in cell i are
denoted by biw and piw, respectively. The term hiw is the
channel gain between the UAV and the worker and In′ is the
interference caused by other workers using the same resource
block.
The energy required by UAV m to receive local model
parameters from all the workers in cell i per iteration is
eURim = pmr
W∑
w=1
zw
rURiw
, (10)
where zw is the data size of the local model parameters of the
worker.
The achievable downlink transmission rate by UAV m to
the worker w in cell i is
rDTiw = bm log2(1 +
hiwpmt
N0bm
). (11)
The energy required by UAV m to transmit the global model
parameters to all workers in cell i per iteration is
eDTim = pmt
W∑
w=1
zBS
rDTiw
. (12)
4) Hovering Energy: Hovering energy is the energy needed
by the UAV to stay near the cell. The hovering energy of
UAV m in any cell i is denoted by ehm.
5) Circuit Energy: Circuit energy is the energy consumed
by the on-board circuits such as computational chips, rotors
and gyroscopes [46]. The on-board circuit energy is important
and needs to be taken into consideration as it affects the
energy-efficiency of the network. The circuit energy of UAV m
is denoted as etm.
In the next section, we present the coalition formation game
among the UAVs.
7IV. COALITIONS OF UAVS
In this section, we present coalitions of UAVs. In particular,
each cell i charges the model owner for the local model
parameters from the cells of workers. The amount of payment
that the model owner needs to pay to the workers in cell i
for their contribution to train the FL model depends on the
importance of cell i, which is σi. In other words, the workers
in cell i earn a revenue for training the FL model. The payment
that cell i receives for participating in the FL training process
is qiσitc , where qi is the price paid by the model owner for a
unit of importance in cell i and tc is the total time needed
to complete the FL task. Note that that the model owner only
makes payment to the workers upon completion of the FL task.
Since the payment is dependent on the total time needed for the
completion of the FL task, the workers have higher incentive
to complete the FL task as fast as they can. Hence, the workers
have higher incentive to bid for nearer UAV coalitions which
is further explained in Section V.
To receive full payment from the model owner, the cells
need to complete µ iterations as required by the model owner.
As a result, the cells of resource-constrained workers require
the UAVs to facilitate the training process so as to improve
communication efficiency. Since some UAVs may not have
sufficient energy resources to support the entire FL process
independently, the UAVs may form coalitions to support the
cells of workers in completing the FL training.
A. Coalition Game Formulation
We have the following definitions for coalition game for-
mulation.
Definition 1. A coalition of UAVs is denoted by Sl ⊆ M,
where l is the index of the coalition [47].
Definition 2. A partition or coalitional structure is a group
of coalitions that spans all players in M and is represented
as Π = {S1, . . . , Sl, . . . , SL}, where Sl ∩ Sl′ = ∅ for l 6= l′,⋃L
l=1 Sl = M and L is the total number of coalitions in
partition Π.
The total number of possible partitions for M players is
given by DM , which is known as the Bellman number given
as follows:
Du =
u−1∑
j=0
(
u− 1
j
)
Dj , for u ≥ 1 and D0 = 1, (13)
M denotes the coalition of all players, which is also known
as the grand coalition.
Definition 3. A partition Π = {S1, . . . , Sl, . . . , SL} is a stable
partition if no coalition Sl has incentive to change the current
partition Π by joining another coalition Sl′ , where Sl∩Sl′ = ∅
for l 6= l′, or splitting into smaller disjoint coalitions [47].
The term of Km(Sl) is the cooperation cost incurred by
UAV m to form a coalition Sl. It includes the cost of
communicating with other UAVs in the same coalition. The
cooperation cost is only incurred when there are two or more
UAVs in a coalition. Otherwise, there is no cooperation cost
incurred by the UAV. Specifically, Km is defined as:
Km(Sl) =
{
Km(Sl), if |Sl| > 2
0, otherwise
, ∀Sl ∈ Π, (14)
where |Sl| is number of coalition members in the coalition Sl.
The coalition formation cost is a non-decreasing function of
the size of the coalition. Note that there is no communication
between the UAV coalitions.
When two or more UAVs cooperate to form a coalition Sl
to support the FL training process in cell i, the FL training
process starts as soon as the nearest UAV reaches cell i. This
nearest UAV aggregates the local model parameters which
are uploaded by the workers in cell i, and transmits the
aggregated local model parameters to the model owner for
the maximum number of iterations that it can support given
its energy capacity. Then, the second nearest UAV in the same
coalition takes over, aggregates the local model parameters and
transmits the aggregated local model parameters to the model
owner. Similarly, after the second nearest UAV completes
its task, the third nearest UAV takes over and continues the
process. If the maximum number of iterations that the UAV
can support is greater than the remaining number of iterations
of the FL training process, the UAV just needs to support
the remaining number of iterations. If the required number of
iterations announced by the model owner is completed by the
nearer UAVs in a coalition, the farther UAVs do not need to
support any iteration of the FL training process. For fairness
purposes, since each UAV in the coalition completes different
number of iterations, the profit earned by each UAV in the
coalition depends on the number of iterations it completes.
Given that each UAV m has an energy capacity of Em, the
maximum number of iterations that each UAV m in coalition
Sl can support to facilitate the FL training process in cell i is
denoted by nim(Sl), where
nim(Sl) =
Em − 2efi,m −Km(Sl)
eURim + e
DR
m + e
UT
m + e
DT
im + e
c
m + e
h
m + e
t
m
.
(15)
Since each coalition Sl, ∀Sl ∈ Π receives different revenues
for facilitating the FL training process in different cell i, an
auction scheme is needed to elicit the valuations of different
cells for each coalition in order to decide on the optimal
allocation of UAV coalitions to the cells of workers given a
partition Π. The mechanism of the auction scheme is explained
further in detail in the next section. Note that the total number
of iterations that all UAVs in a coalition Sl, ∀Sl ∈ Π can
support determines the choices of coalitions that each cell of
workers can bid for. The coalition formation game determines
the stable partition that allows the UAVs to earn a maximum
profit.
Proposition 1. The formation of grand coalition, where all
the UAVs join a single coalition, is not always stable.
Proof. In order to prove that the grand coalition is not always
the optimal coalitional structure among the UAVs, we show
that the coalitional game is not superadditive and prove that the
8Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Coalition Formation of UAVs
using Merge-and-Split.
Input: Set of UAVs M = {1, . . . ,m, . . . ,M}
Output: Partition that provides highest profit Π∗ = {S∗1 , . . . , S∗y , . . . , S∗Y }
1: Initialize a set of partitions Z = {Π1, . . . ,Πt, . . . ,ΠT } that includes
all possible partitions where T is the total number of partitions
2: Compute allocations of UAVs to cells of workers and the maximum
obtainable profit given current partition, Πcurr from Algorithm 2
3: Merge Mechanism:
4: for each coalition Sl in Πcurr do
5: Consider hypothetical partition Πnew where Sl ∪ Sl′ , l 6= l′
6: Compute the optimal allocation of UAVs and maximum attainable
profit, γ(Πnew) from Algorithm 2
7: if γ(Πnew) > γ(Πcurr) then
8: Merge coalitions Sl and Sl′
9: Update partition Πcurr ← Πnew
10: Update total profit γ(Πcurr)← γ(Πnew)
11: end if
12: end for
13: return Πmerge = {S1, . . . , Sg , . . . , SG}
14: Split Mechanism:
15: for each coalition Sg in Πmerge do
16: Initialize set of possible coalition splits S˜g = {S˜1, . . . , S˜g , . . . , S˜G}
17: for each coalition S˜g in Sg do
18: Consider hypothetical partition Π′new
19: Compute the optimal allocation of UAVs and maximum attainable
profit, γ(Π′new) from Algorithm 2
20: if γ(Π′new) > γ(Πcurr) then
21: Split coalitions Sg such that Sg ← S˜g
22: Update partition Πcurr ← Π′new
23: Update total profit γ(Πcurr)← γ(Π′new)
24: end if
25: end for
26: end for
27: return Final partition that provides the highest profit Π∗ =
{S∗1 , . . . , S∗y , . . . , S∗Y }
core of the proposed game is empty by following the procedure
in [48].
A coalitional game is superadditive if the cooperation
among disjoint coalitions to form a larger coalition, guarantees
a payoff which is at least equal to that obtained by the disjoint
coalitions separately, i.e., x(S1 ∪ S2) ≥ x(S1) + x(S2), S1 ∈
M, S2 ∈M and S1 ∩S2 = ∅. Consider two coalitions where
coalition S1 is allocated to cell i to support the FL task in
cell i and earning a profit of xi(S1) whereas coalition S2
is not allocated to any cell and earning zero profit, i.e.,
xi(S2) = 0, ∀i ∈ I . By merging coalition S1 and coalition S2
to support the same cell i, the revenue, i.e., the payment
price of cell i does not change, but the total cost in terms
of energy incurred and coalitional cost also increases. Thus,
xi(S1 ∪ S2) < xi(S1), i.e., the marginal profit of the UAVs
from merging the two coalitions is negative. Therefore, the
coalitional game is non-superadditive.
Next, we prove that the core of the proposed game is
empty. As defined in [48], an imputation is a payoff vector
z = {z1, . . . , zm, . . . , zM} that satisfies the following two
conditions:
1) group rational, i.e.,
∑
m∈M zm = x(M), and
2) individually rational where each player obtains a benefit
no less than acting alone, i.e., zm ≥ x({m}) ∀i.
The core of the coalition is the set of stable imputations where
there is no incentive for any coalition Sl ∈ M to reject the
proposed payoff allocation z, deviate from the grand coalition
and form coalition Sl. The core of the coalition is defined as:
τ =
{
z :
∑
m∈M
zm = x(M) and
∑
m∈Sl
zm ≥ x(Sl) ∀Sl ∈M
}
As we have previously established that the marginal profit of
merging the coalitions can be negative, this means that the con-
dition of individual rationality is violated, i.e.,
∑
m∈Sl zm <
x(Sl). In particular, the profit is higher if coalition S1 does
not merge with coalition S2 to form a larger coalition. The
core of the proposed coalitional game is empty.
Therefore, due to the non-superadditivity of the coalitional
game and the emptiness of the core, the grand coalition
does not form among the UAVs. Instead, smaller and disjoint
coalitions of UAVs will form in the FL network.
As such, we discuss the joint auction-coalition formation
algorithm next.
B. Coalition Formation Algorithm
Following [49], we define two simple merge-and-split op-
erations to modify a partition Π in M.
• Merge Rule: Merge any set of coalitions {S1, . . . , Sl}
where γ(Π) < γ(Πnew), thus {S1, . . . , Sl} →
⋃l
j=1 Sj .
• Split Rule: Split any set of coalitions {⋃lj=1 Sj} where
γ(Π) < γ(Π′new), thus
⋃l
j=1 Sj → {S1, . . . , Sl}.
The merge-and-split algorithm for the coalition formation
is presented in Algorithm 1.
The merge mechanism is illustrated from the perspective
of a representative coalition Sl in a given partition Π. The
coalition Sl decides to merge with another coalition Sl′ where
l 6= l′ and Sl ∈ M if the total profit of the UAVs is
improved. In order to evaluate the profits, the UAVs assume the
hypothetical partition Πnew and compute maximum attainable
profit of the hypothetical partition, γ(Πnew) (lines 5-6), of
which the bidding of the workers and the allocation of UAVs
are discussed in the next section. If the total profit of the
UAVs in the hypothetical partition Πnew, which is denoted
by γ(Πnew), is higher than that in its current partition Πcurr,
which is represented as γ(Πcurr), coalition Sl will merge with
coalition Sl′ to form new partition Πnew (lines 7-8). Then,
given this new partition Πnew, the current partition and the
value of the maximum profit will be updated (lines 9-10).
On the other hand, γ(Πnew) is less than that of the current
partition Πcurr, γ(Πcurr), there will be no change to the
current partition Πcurr. For the next iteration, any coalition
Sl in the given partition, Πcurr, will consider to form a
coalition with another coalition Sl′ . The merge mechanism
terminates when all possible partitions have been considered.
At the end of the merge mechanism, the algorithm returns a
resulting partition Πmerge = {S1, . . . , Sg, . . . , SG} (line 13).
Consequently, the split mechanism is carried out.
Similarly, the split mechanism is illustrated from the per-
spective of a representative coalition Sg in partition Πmerge.
Let S˜g be the set of possible coalition splits for coalition Sg ,
where S˜g = {S˜1, . . . , S˜g, . . . , S˜G} (line 16). Coalition Sg
considers one of the possible ways to split its coalition into
smaller disjoint coalitions (line 17). Similar to the merge
9mechanism, in order to evaluate the profits, the UAVs assume
the hypothetical partition Π′new and retrieve the bids from
the auction and compute their maximum obtainable profits
(lines 18-19). If the total profit of the UAVs is improved
with more disjoint coalitions, the coalition Sg will proceed
to split and form a new partition Π′new (lines 20-21). The
current partition and the value of maximum profit will be
updated (lines 22-23). Then, given the new partition Π′new,
any coalition will split and evaluate their profits again. The
partition is maintained if the profit is higher than if the split is
carried out. The split mechanism terminates when all possible
partitions with smaller coalitions have been considered. At
the end of the merge-and-split algorithm, the final partition
Π∗ = {S∗1 , . . . , S∗y , . . . , S∗Y } is returned (line 27).
Proposition 2. The final partition Π∗ =
{S∗1 , . . . , S∗y , . . . , S∗Y } is a stable partition that maximizes the
total profit of the UAVs.
Proof. Given any current partition Πcurr =
{S1, . . . , Sl, . . . , SL}, where Sl ∩ Sl′ = ∅ for l 6= l′,⋃L
l=1 Sl = M, the current partition Πcurr is only updated
when the total profit of the hypothetical partition Πnew
is higher than that of the current partition Πcurr by
either merging two disjoint coalitions or splitting a single
coalition into multiple smaller disjoint coalitions. Therefore,
the merge-and-split algorithm (Algorithm 1) generates a
sequence of partitions where each partition has either equal
profit as or higher profit than the partition from previous
iteration. The total number of possible partition DM is
a finite number. The algorithm will eventually terminate
at a partition Π∗ = {S∗1 , . . . , S∗y , . . . , S∗Y } where the
total profit of partition Π∗ cannot be increased further by
merging or splitting coalitions. Hence, the final partition
Π∗ = {S∗1 , . . . , S∗y , . . . , S∗Y } is stable. In addition, at
stable partition Π∗ = {S∗1 , . . . , S∗y , . . . , S∗Y }, since the
total profit of the UAVs cannot be increased further by
changing the partition Π∗, the total profit given by partition
Π∗ = {S∗1 , . . . , S∗y , . . . , S∗Y } is the maximum.
Next, we present an auction design to elicit the valuations
of cells of workers for all possible UAV coalitions in order
to determine the allocation of UAV coalitions to the cells of
workers, thereby maximizing the profit of the UAVs given a
partition Π.
V. AUCTION DESIGN
We consider multiple auctioneers and multiple buyers at the
same time. The UAVs are the auctioneers which conduct the
auctions and offer the resources to facilitate the FL training
process. The cells of workers are the buyers that submit bids
and pay the UAVs for their energy resource.
A. Buyers’ Bids
Firstly, the workers in cell i (∀i ∈ I) submit their bids to
each possible coalition Sl in a given partition Π to indicate
their valuations for each coalition.
Each cell needs to build their own preference over all
the possible coalitions that can provide services, where cells
of workers need to compare the coalitions and rank their
preferences. As such, the concept of preference relation is
introduced to evaluate the order of preference of each player.
Definition 4. For any player i ∈ I, a preference relation [50]
i is defined as a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary
relation over the set of all coalitions that cell i can choose.
In particular, for any cell i ∈ I, given S1 ⊆ M and
S2 ⊆M, S1 i S2 means that cell i prefers coalition S1 over
coalition S2, or at least cell i prefers both coalition equally.
The asymmetric counter part of i, which is represented by
i, when used in S1 i S2, means that cell i strictly prefers
coalition S1 over coalition S2. It is worth noting that the
preference relation is defined to quantify the preferences of the
players, which can be application-specific. For example, the
IoV components prefer UAVs that are nearer for road safety
applications but prefer UAVs that provide higher bandwidth
for entertainment services. It can represent a function of
parameters such as the utility gain by joining the coalition.
The preference relation for any cell i ∈ I can be represented
by the following formula,
S1 i S2 ⇐⇒ αi(S1) ≥ αi(S2), (16)
where S1 ⊆ M and S2 ⊆ M, αi(Sl) is the preference
function for any cell i ∈ I and for any coalition Sl facilitating
FL training process in cell i.
In general, the more important cells of workers have in-
centives to pay the UAVs more to support the FL training
process as they receive higher reward for completing the FL
task. Meanwhile, the valuations of the cells for the UAVs
depend on the latency of the task, i.e., how quickly the model
parameters are transmitted to the model owner. As such, the
cells of workers have more incentive to employ UAVs that are
nearer to them since shorter time is required for them to reach
the cell to facilitate FL training. Although the FL training
process starts as soon as the nearest UAV in a coalition reaches
the cell of workers, the valuation of the cell of workers for
the UAV coalition does not depend on the nearest UAV in the
coalition. In fact, the valuation of the cell of workers for a
coalition Sl depends on the farthest UAV in the coalition as
they need to wait for the farthest UAV to arrive to continue
and complete the FL training process, even if other nearer
UAVs can reach the cell and support their parts of the training
process in a short amount of time. Specifically, the time for
the farthest UAV to reach the cell may be longer than the time
needed by the nearer UAVs to travel to the cell and complete
their parts of the FL training process.
Thus the valuation of workers in cell i for coalition Sl,
which is also the preference function, is defined as
αi(Sl) = θ1qiσi +
θ2
max
m∈Sl
tmi
, (17)
where tmi is the time needed for UAV m to travel to cell i, θ1 is
the weight parameter of the importance of the cell of workers
whereas θ2 is the weight parameter of the time needed for the
UAVs to reach the cells. In particular, each cell i submits its
valuations for each UAV coalition in a given partition Π. Each
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cell i will only submit its bids to any coalition Sl, ∀Sl ∈ Π
if the total number of iterations that can be completed by the
coalition Sl is greater than the required number of iterations
specified by the model owner. In other words, coalition Sl will
only receive bids from any cell i if the following condition is
satisfied: ∑
m∈Sl
nim(Sl) ≥ µ. (18)
The traditional first-price auction, in which the highest
bidder pays the exact bid it submits, maximizes the revenue of
the seller, but does not guarantee that the bidders submit their
true valuations. In other words, the bidders have incentives to
not submit their true valuations. In particular, if the bidder
bids lower and wins the bid, its utility increases. Hence,
by adopting the first-price auction, the property of incentive
compatibility of the auction is not guaranteed. As such, the
second-price auction is adopted to determine the payment price
of the bid winners where the bid winners need to pay only the
price equals the winning bid if the original bid winner is not
considered in the auction. The payment price is determined to
incentivize the cells of workers to honestly report their true
valuations such that the valuations of the cells of workers are
equal to their bids, i.e., αi(Sl) = λi(Sl), where λi(Sl) is the
bid submitted by cell i to coalition Sl. The payment price of
cell i for coalition Sl is represented by pi(Sl). Thus, the utility
of cell i if it wins the bid is defined as:
ui(Sl) = αi(Sl)− pi(Sl). (19)
On the other hand, if cell i is not allocated any UAV coalition,
the utility is ui(Sl) = 0.
B. Sellers’ Problem
The UAVs as the auctioneers need to decide on the optimal
allocation to different cells of workers. The algorithm for
the allocation of profit-maximizing UAVs is presented in
Algorithm 2.
The objective of the UAVs is to maximize sum of their
individual profits where the UAVs cooperate fully with each
other and are not selfish. In order to calculate the maximum
total profits for any partition Π, the maximum possible profit
for each coalition in the partition needs to be calculated first.
The coalition will only earn the actual profit if it is allocated
to support the FL task in any cell i. Given any partition Π,
the revenue of coalition Sl in supporting cell i is the payment
price, i.e., pi(Sl), which can be evaluated from the bid values
(lines 3-4). The cost of coalition Sl in supporting cell i is the
summation of energy incurred by each UAV in the coalition
(line 5). The cost of coalition Sl in supporting cell i is denoted
as ci(Sl), which is defined as:
ci(Sl) = δm
∑
m∈Sl
2efi,m +
∑
m∈Sl
Km(Sl)
+δm
∑
m∈Sl
ncim(e
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where ncim is the number of iterations that is supported by
UAV m in cell i and δm is the cost coefficient per unit of
energy spent by UAV m. Note that it is not necessary that
each UAV in the coalition supports the maximum number of
iterations, nim. If the number of remaining iterations is less
than the maximum number of iterations that the UAV can
support, the UAV needs to only support the remaining number
of iterations, which requires less energy.
The possible profit earned by coalition Sl for supporting FL
training process in any cells i ∈ I is the difference between
the revenue earned and the cost incurred by coalition Sl in
facilitating the FL training in cell i (line 5). The possible profit
denoted by xi(Sl) can be represented by
xi(Sl) = pi(Sl)− ci(Sl). (21)
In this regard, each coalition Sl in partition Π can now
evaluate the most preferable cell that provides them with the
maximum profit (line 12). If two or more coalitions choose the
same cell of workers, the coalition of UAVs which is the most
preferred based on the bids submitted will be allocated (lines
13-14). For example, according to the preference relation in
Equation (16), coalition Sl will be allocated to cell i, instead
of coalition Sl′ if αi(Sl) ≥ αi(Sl′). The coalition of UAVs
which are not allocated any cell will not earn any profit.
If there is no competition among coalitions of UAVs for a
cell, the UAV coalition is allocated to the cell (lines 15-16).
Given partition Π and the allocation of UAV coalitions to the
cells, the total profits can be calculated by summing up the
individual profits of each coalition which is allocated a cell
(lines 18-19). The total profits of partition Π is given by γ(Π),
which is defined as follows:
γ(Π) =
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
βilxi(Sl), (22)
where βil = {βi1, . . . , βil, . . . , βiL} is an allocation vector
which indicates whether coalition Sl is allocated to cell i. In
particular, βil = 1 if coalition Sl is allocated to cell i and
βil = 0 if coalition Sl is not allocated to cell i.
Then, the allocated coalition is removed from the current
partition, Π and the corresponding cell is also removed from
the list of cells (line 20). The number of cells to be supported
reduces by one (line 21).
C. Analysis of the Auction
We now analyze the individual rationality and the incentive
compatibility of the auction mechanism. Firstly, to encourage
the buyers to participate in the auction, the auctioneers need to
ensure that the buyers receive positive payoffs. Moreover, the
auction mechanism discourages the buyers from submitting
untruthful valuations that do not reflect the true valuations of
buyers’ bids.
Proposition 3. Each buyer, i.e., cell of workers, achieves
individual rationality in this auction mechanism.
Proof. Firstly, for each cell of workers which has no winning
bid, its utility is zero, i.e., ui(Sl) = 0 since it does not earn
a revenue from the model owner and it also does not pay any
UAV coalition to complete the FL task. Secondly, for the cells
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for Allocation of Profit-Maximizing
UAVs.
Input: Current partition Π = {S1, . . . , Sl, . . . , SL}
Output: Maximum obtainable profit, γ(Π) and allocation of UAVs to cells
of workers
1: for each cell of workers i in I do
2: for each coalition of UAVs Sl in Π do
3: Submit bid values, αi(Sl)
4: Compute payment price, pi(Sl) if cell i is the bid winner for
coalition Sl
5: Compute the cost of each UAV coalition Sl in supporting cell i
6: Compute the profit of each UAV coalition Sl in supporting cell i,
xi(Sl)
7: end for
8: end for
9: Initialize t = I
10: Initialize γ(Π) = 0
11: while t 6= 0 do
12: Identify the highest profit for each coalition and its corresponding cell,
xi(Sl) in Π
13: if Two or more UAV coalitions compete for the same cell then
14: The cell with the highest bid is allocated the coalition
15: else
16: The coalition (without competition) is allocated the cell
17: end if
18: Update partition Π
19: γ(Π)← γ(Π) + xi(Sl)
20: Remove allocated UAVs and cell from the partition Π
21: t = t− 1
22: end while
23: return γ(Π) and allocation of UAVs to cells of workers
of workers with winning bids, i.e., allocated a UAV coalition
to support the FL training process, their utility is:
ui(Sl) = αi(Sl)− pi(Sl) = λi(Sl)− pi(Sl), (23)
The utility gained by the bid winner is non-negative, i.e.,
ui(Sl) > 0. When λi(Sl) wins the bid, its true valuation must
be greater than the payment price, i.e., αi(Sl) > pi(Sl) =
λi′(Sl). Otherwise, λi′(Sl) wins the bid instead.
In order to prove the property of incentive compatibility,
i.e., the truthfulness of buyers’ bids, we show that there
is no incentive for the buyers to submit bids other than
their true valuations by following the procedure in [51]. The
auction mechanism is truthful if it satisfies the following two
conditions:
1) The winning bid algorithm is monotonic.
2) The pricing is independent of the winning bid.
Proposition 4. The winning bid algorithm is monotonic. For
each bid λi(Sl), if bid λi(Sl) wins, then bid λ′i(Sl) also wins,
where λ′i(Sl) = λi(Sl) + φ and φ > 0.
Proof. Suppose that λi(Sl) is the winning bid with the UAV
coalition Sl earning a profit xi(Sl), a higher bid λ′i(Sl), where
λ′i(Sl) = λi(Sl) + φ and φ > 0, will result in the same profit
xi(Sl), since the cost of coalition Sl for supporting the FL
training process in cell i and the price of the winning bid,
pi(Sl) are the same, λ′i(Sl) still wins the bid.
Proposition 5. If cell i wins the bidding with λi(Sl) and
λ′i(Sl), the payment price pi(Sl) is the same for both bids.
Proof. As long as cell i wins the bid, the payment price of
the bid winner is the second price. By bidding either λi(Sl)
or λ′i(Sl), the payment price does not change. Hence, the
payment price is independent of the winning bid λi(Sl) or
λ′i(Sl).
Proposition 6. No buyer, i.e., cell of workers can achieve
higher payoff by bidding with values other than its true
valuations, i.e., if a buyer bids λ′i(Sl) 6= λi(Sl), its utility
is u′i(Sl) ≤ ui(Sl).
Proof. Following a similar procedure in [51], we consider two
cases.
Case 1. If cell i wins the bid for coalition Sl, it needs to
pay pi(Sl) which is equal to the second highest winning bid.
If cell i decides to bid untruthfully with λ′i(Sl) ≥ λi(Sl),
cell i still wins the bid according to Proposition 4 without any
increase in utility. On the other hand, if cell i decides to bid
untruthfully with λ′i(Sl) ≤ λi(Sl), cell i may still win the bid
without any increase in utility according to Proposition 5 or
lose the bid, which leads to a reduction in utility.
Case 2. If cell i loses the bid for coalition Sl, it does not
need to pay anything. If cell i bids untruthfully with λ′i(Sl) ≥
λi(Sl), cell i may win the bid but suffer from a non-positive
utility or lose the bid with no change in utility. If cell i bids
untruthfully with λi(Sl) ≤ λi(Sl), it will still lose the bid.
Therefore, the buyer is not incentivized to bid untruthfully
since by doing so, it is not able to achieve higher utility.
Therefore, the auction mechanism has the properties of
individual rationality and incentive compatibility.
D. Complexity of the Joint Auction-Coalition Algorithm
In this subsection, we investigate the complexity of the
joint auction-coalition algorithm. The time complexity of the
proposed algorithm depends on the number of attempts of the
merge and split operations. Since for each attempt involves
the auction-based allocation of which the time complexity
increases linearly with the number of cells of workers, the
overall time complexity of the proposed algorithm is given by
the multiplication of the number of merge and split attempts
and the complexity of the auction-based allocation.
For a given partition, the merge operation is carried out if
the merging of two coalitions results in a higher total profit
than if the two coalitions operate independently. In the worst
case scenario, each UAV coalition attempts to merge with all
other UAV coalitions. At the start, all UAVs form singleton
coalitions, which result in M coalitions. In the worst case,
M(M−1)
2 number of attempts required before the first merge
operation is carried out, (M−1)(M−2)2 number of attempts
required before the second merge operation is carried out and
so on. The total number of attempts of merge operations is
in O(M3) for the worst case scenario. However, in practice,
the merge process requires a significantly lower number of
attempts. Once the UAV coalitions merge to form a larger
coalition, the number of merge attempts per coalition reduces
since the number of merging possibilities for the remaining
UAVs decreases.
In the worst case scenario, splitting a UAV coalition Sl
involves finding all possible partitions of the UAVs in the
coalition. The number of possible partitions of a set of UAVs
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Fig. 3. Distributed FL Network with 3 cells and 6 UAVs.
is given by the Bellman number in Equation (13), which
increases exponentially in the number of UAVs in the set. In
practice, the split operation is not performed over the set that
consists of all UAVs, but over the smaller set of each formed
UAV coalition. Since the UAVs incur higher cooperation cost
by forming a larger coalitions in Equation (14), they prefer to
form coalitions of smaller size where possible. As a result, the
split operation is affordable in terms of complexity.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the joint auction-coalition for-
mation framework of the UAVs. Firstly, we evaluate com-
munication efficiency in the UAV-enabled network. Then, we
analyze the preference of each cell for each UAV, followed by
the profit-maximizing behavior of the UAVs and the allocation
of UAVs to different cells of workers. Finally, we compared the
proposed framework against existing schemes. We consider a
distributed FL network on a Cartesian grid of size 1000×1000
as shown in Fig. 3. All simulation parameters are summarized
in Table II.
The sensors of the IoV components such as the vehicles and
the RSUs typically have sampling rates that range between 250
samples per second (sps) to 32000 sps. The IoV components,
i.e., the FL workers are selected to train the FL model if their
importance, σiw ≥ 1. The training datasets that the FL workers
use to train the FL model consist of the samples collected by
their sensors. Thus, the FL workers with sensors of higher
sampling rates have larger training datasets as compared to
the FL workers with sensors of lower sampling rates. Note
that since the selected FL workers only transmit the local
model parameters to the model owner, the size of the training
datasets does not affect the size of the transmitted local model
parameters.
A. Communication Efficiency in FL Network
The introduction of UAVs to the FL network can improve
the communication efficiency. According to [13], we set the
bandwidth of IoV components, denoted by biw = 150kHz,
the channel gain between FL server and the IoV components,
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Parameter Values
Total Number of Cells, I 3
Total Number of UAVs, M 6
Minimum Threshold Level of Importance, ζ 1
Sampling Rate of Worker, siw 250sps - 32000sps
Bandwidth of Worker, biw [13] 50kHz - 150kHz
Transmission Power of Worker, piw [13] 1mW - 10mW
Channel Gain of Worker, hiw 2dBm - 8dBm
Data Size of Worker, zw 100 MB
Data Size of Cell, zc 500 MB
Flying Energy per Unit Time, ef 1000mW
Flying Velocity of UAV, v 10m/s
Computational Coefficient, κ [42] 10−26
Computational Capability of UAV, fm 108
Total Number of CPU Cycles, am 1GHz - 3GHz
Hovering Energy, ehm 5 J
Circuit Energy, etm 5 J
Bandwidth of UAV, bm 200kHz - 400kHz
Transmission Power of UAV, pmt [52] 0.5W - 5W
Receiving Power of UAV, pmr 0.5W - 1W
Channel Gain of UAV, hm 5dBm - 25dBm
Cooperation Cost, Km 2
Price coefficient of UAV per unit energy, δm 0.03
Data Size of Model Owner, zBS 1500 MB
Transmission Power of Model Owner, pBS [52] 10W
Bandwidth of Model Owner, bBS 5000kHz
Number of FL Iterations, µ 20
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Fig. 4. Communication Time Needed by UAVs and IoV Components.
hiw = 2dBm, N0 = -174 dBm/Hz and the range of transmis-
sion power, piw is between 1mW and 10mW. For the UAVs,
similar to [52], we set the transmission power of UAVs, pmt,
to be between 0.5W and 5W. We also set the bandwidth of the
UAVs, bm = 400kHz and the channel gain of the FL server and
the UAVs, hm = 5dBm. From Fig. 4, we can observe that the
communication time needed for the UAVs to transmit the local
parameters to the FL server is much lower than that required
by the IoV components, hence improving the communication
efficiency in completing the FL task. Note that even without
taking into account of the probability of link failure and the
straggler’s effect, the communication time required by the IoV
components is much larger than that of the UAVs.
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TABLE III
PREFERENCE OF CELLS FOR DIFFERENT COALITIONS.
Cell ID Coordinates Importance Top Preference of Cells
Cell 1 (200, 300) 18.4 {3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3} or {1, 2, 3}
Cell 2 (500, 700) 25.2 {6}, {2, 6}
Cell 3 (800, 600) 34.6 {6}
B. Preference of Cells of Workers
In order to analyze the preference of cells for the UAVs
and to determine their valuations in the bidding process, there
are three factors that need to be taken into account, i.e., the
importance of the cell, the time required by the UAVs to
reach the cell, as well as the ability of the UAVs to complete
the FL task. We consider 3 cells where Cell 1, Cell 2 and
Cell 3 are located at coordinates (200, 300), (500, 700) and
(800, 600), respectively, as presented in second column of
Table III. Column 4 of Table III shows the top preference
of each cell.
Firstly, the cells submit their bids based on their own
importance. The more important they are, the higher they earn
from the payment by the model owner, and thus have higher
incentive to employ UAVs to complete the FL task. Based on
the sampling rate of the vehicles or RSUs, the importance of
the vehicles or RSUs to the FL server is also calculated. Cell 3
is the most important cell with an importance value of 34.6
whereas Cell 1 is the least important cell with an importance
value of 18.4. We assume that the price that the model owner
pays for each unit of importance is the same for all 3 cells,
i.e., q1 = q2 = q3 = 3. Secondly, the valuations of each
cell also depend on the time required by the UAVs to reach
the cell. Cells of workers prefer UAVs that are nearer as they
receive higher payment by the model owner for completing the
task in a shorter period of time. We assume that the weight
parameters for both cell importance and travelling time for
the UAVs to the cells to be equal, i.e., θ1 = θ2 = 0.5. The 6
UAVs are randomly distributed, among which their coordinates
are presented in column 2 of Table IV. We can calculate
the Euclidean distance between cells and UAVs based on the
coordinates of them. Since we assume that the UAVs travel at
constant velocity v, the time required by UAV m to reach cell
i, denoted as tmi , can be computed by dividing distance over
velocity, i.e., tmi =
dmi
v . Thirdly, each cell will only submit
bids to the UAVs that can complete the FL task, i.e., fulfil the
requirement of completing a certain number of iterations as
denoted by the model owner.
To illustrate the preference analysis of the cells of workers,
we first consider the scenario in which each UAV facilitates
the FL training in the cells individually, i.e., no coalition is
formed yet. Table V illustrates the preference of each cell for
each UAV. Cell 1 prefers UAV 3 the most. For Cell 2 and
Cell 3, it is clearly seen that both cells prefer UAV 6. This is
mainly because UAV 3 is nearest to Cell 1, whereas UAV 6
is nearest to Cell 2 and Cell 3. In addition to that, all cells do
not submit any valuation for both UAV 1 and UAV 2 as they
cannot individually fulfil the number of iterations required for
TABLE IV
PREFERENCE OF UAVS FOR DIFFERENT CELLS.
UAV ID Coordinates Energy Capacity (Joules) Preference
UAV 1 (100, 100) 200 -
UAV 2 (300, 500) 500 -
UAV 3 (100, 600) 1000 Cell 3
UAV 4 (600, 200) 1250 Cell 3
UAV 5 (900, 200) 3000 Cell 3
UAV 6 (800, 800) 3500 Cell 3
TABLE V
PREFERENCE OF CELLS FOR INDIVIDUAL UAVS.
UAV ID Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3
UAV 1 0 0 0
UAV 2 0 0 0
UAV 3 43.4 49.9 59.0
UAV 4 39.7 47.6 63.1
UAV 5 34.7 45.6 64.2
UAV 6 34.0 53.6 76.9
the FL task. This is because UAV 1 and UAV 2 have low
energy capacities (as shown in Table IV), thereby they are not
able to support any cell individually.
However, the allocation of UAVs to the cells solely based
on the valuations submitted by the cells may not benefit the
UAVs. Taking Cell 2 as an example. If only a single UAV
is considered in supporting a cell, Cell 2 will lose out to
Cell 3 in the bidding process for UAV 6 since Cell 3 bids
higher for UAV 6. As a result, Cell 2 is left with UAV 3,
UAV 4 and UAV 5 to bid for. Among the remaining choices,
Cell 2 prefers UAV 3 the most. Thus, Cell 1 will lose out to
Cell 2 in bidding for UAV 3 and thus, with UAV 4 as the most
preferred choice among the remaining UAVs. It may not be
economically efficient for UAV 4 to be allocated to Cell 1 as
it is far away from Cell 1. The energy needed for UAV 4 to
travel to Cell 1 and back to its original position may offset the
profit earned in supporting the FL training process in Cell 1.
On the other hand, it may be more cost-effective for UAV 1
and UAV 3 to cooperate to support Cell 1 since the energy
needed to reach Cell 1 is smaller.
We then consider coalition formation between two or more
UAVs. Previously, when only individual UAVs are considered,
UAV 1 and UAV 2 are not considered due to the limited energy
capacities in completing the training process individually.
However, when coalitions can be formed, UAV 1 and UAV 2
are now considered where either of them forms a coalition
with UAV 3 or both of them form a coalition with UAV 3.
From the perspective of Cell 1, it is indifferent among {3},
coalitions {1, 3}, {2, 3} and {1, 2, 3}. The valuations of Cell 1
for these coalitions are the same as the time needed for all the
UAVs in the respective coalitions to reach Cell 1 is equal and
they are capable of completing the FL task. Note that the time
needed for all UAVs in a coalition to reach a cell is determined
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by the UAV that is farthest from the cell. Similarly, Cell 2 is
indifferent between {6} and coalition {2, 6}. Cell 3 prefers
UAV 6 since it is capable of completing the task individually
and it is nearest to Cell 3.
However, there are two challenges to solve in determining
the allocation of UAVs to different cells of workers. Firstly,
two cells may prefer the same UAVs. For example, both Cell
2 and Cell 3 prefer UAV 6 but it is not possible for UAV 6
to support both cells at the same time. Secondly, it may not
be profitable for some UAVs to support certain cells even if
they are preferred by the cells. For example, coalition {1,2,3}
is equally preferred by Cell 1 as coalitions {1, 3}, {1, 2} and
{3}. However, it may not be profitable for coalition {1, 2, 3}
to support Cell 1 if a smaller coalition of UAVs can complete
the task at a lower cost.
As such, we discuss the profit-maximizing behaviour of the
UAVs as follows.
C. Profit-Maximizing Behavior of UAVs
To analyze the profit-maximizing behavior of the UAVs, we
consider 6 UAVs with different levels of energy capacity, i.e.,
low, medium and high (as previously presented in third column
of Table IV).
Fig. 5 shows the maximum number of iterations given the
different energy capacities. It is obvious that the larger the
energy capacity of the UAV, the larger the number of iterations
that the UAV can support. Individually, UAV 1 and UAV 2 do
not choose to support any cell as the possible profit earned
in supporting any cell is negative. For UAV 1 and UAV 2,
since the valuation bids of all cells are zero, it is natural
not to support any cell as they are not earning any revenue.
Meanwhile, the profit-maximizing property of the UAVs has
resulted in the competition of UAV 3, UAV 4, UAV 5 and
UAV 6 to facilitate FL training in the same cell, i.e., Cell 3.
However, by allocating UAV 3, UAV 4, UAV 5 and UAV 6
to Cell 3, the revenue earned does not increase but the cost
increases which contribute to the overall smaller profit earned.
Thus, it is possible to allocate one of the UAVs to another cell
such that the overall profit of the UAVs is higher, which is
discussed in the next subsection.
TABLE VI
REVENUE, COST OF PROFIT FOR DIFFERENT COALITIONS IN EACH CELL.
Coalition
Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3
Rev. Cost Prof. Rev. Cost Prof. Rev. Cost Prof.
{3} 43.4 23.5 19.9 49.9 16.2 33.7 59.0 21.5 37.5
{1, 3} 43.4 17.9 25.5 44.7 22.4 22.4 57.7 23.1 34.6
{2, 3} 43.4 32.9 10.5 49.9 32.7 17.2 59.0 31.5 27.5
{1, 2, 3} 43.4 26.8 16.6 44.7 40.0 4.70 57.1 38.4 19.3
{6} 34.0 53.8 -19.8 53.6 33.8 19.8 76.9 34.8 42.1
{2, 6} 34.0 34.3 -0.33 53.6 32.4 21.2 61.7 40.3 21.4
Given the varied energy cost of the UAVs and different
revenue from different cells, each UAV coalition earns dif-
ferent profits for supporting different cells of workers. From
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Fig. 6. Illustration of Merge-and-Split Mechanism and Allocation of UAVs
to Cells of Workers.
Table VI, we observe that although the valuations for coali-
tions {3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3} and {1, 2, 3} by Cell 1 are the same,
the costs are different. As a result, the profit of coalition {1, 3}
is the highest if it is allocated to Cell 1. The addition of
UAV 2 to the coalition only incurs extra cost, which leads
to a lower profit. Hence, it is not economically viable for
coalition {1, 2, 3} to be allocated to Cell 1. Similarly, for
Cell 2, coalitions {2, 6} and {6} have same valuation. It costs
lower for Cell 2 to be supported by a coalition of UAV 2 and
UAV 6 instead of UAV 6 individually.
With the different revenue and cost structures of the UAVs,
we next discuss the auction-based UAV-cell allocation.
D. Allocation of UAVs to Cells of Workers
Given the valuations of cells for different coalitions of
UAVs through the auction, the UAVs as the auctioneers need
to decide on the allocation of UAVs to the different cells
of workers such that the total profit earned by all UAVs is
maximized and the preferences of the cells of workers are
taken into account.
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The merge-and-split algorithm is used to determine the
partition of the UAVs that maximizes the total profit. Fig. 6
demonstrates the merge-and-split mechanism that determines
the partition that increases the total profit earned. When
each UAV is considered individually where no coalition is
formed, the maximum total attainable profit is achieved when
UAV 4 is allocated to Cell 1, UAV 3 is allocated to Cell 2
while UAV 6 is allocated to Cell 3. UAV 1, UAV 2 and
UAV 5 are not allocated to any cell. The maximum total
attainable profit is increased when the partition changes to
{{1, 3}, {2, 4}, {5}, {6}} through a merge mechanism, where
UAV 1 and UAV 3 are allocated to Cell 1, UAV 2 and UAV
4 are allocated to Cell 2 and UAV 6 is allocated to Cell 3.
Then, the split mechanism results in a change in partition
again to {{1, 3}, {2}, {4}, {5}, {6}}, where coalition {1, 3}
is allocated to Cell 1, UAV 4 is allocated to Cell 2 and UAV 6
is allocated to Cell 3. A change in partition will only occur
when it results in an increase in total profit earned given the
optimal allocation of UAVs to cells.
Although UAV 5 is positively valued by all 3 cells of
workers, it is not allocated to any cell. From the perspective
of Cell 1, coalition {1, 3} can support the FL task at a lower
cost than that of UAV 5. Similarly, the costs of UAV 4
and UAV 6, if they are allocated to Cell 2 and Cell 3
respectively, are lower than that if any of the cell is supported
by UAV 5. Moreover, UAV 2 is also not allocated to any
cell. As mentioned in Section VI-C, the profit decreases when
UAV 2 joins coalition {1, 3} in supporting Cell 1, hence it
is more profitable for coalition {1, 3} to be allocated to Cell
1, instead of coalition {1, 2, 3}. UAV 2 also does not join
UAV 4 in supporting Cell 2. Although UAV 2 is nearer to
Cell 2, it is not capable of completing the FL task individually.
The valuations of Cell 2 for UAV 4 and coalition {2, 4} are
the same. However, it is more cost-effective for Cell 2 to be
supported only by UAV 4 instead of both UAV 2 and UAV 4.
As such, we see that the grand coalition, where all UAVs join
a single coalition, is not stable, thus validating our proof in
Section IV-B. In fact, by forming the grand coalition, it can
only be allocated to Cell 3 with a profit of 2.12 as the UAVs
will not earn positive profit if they are allocated to either Cell 1
or Cell 2.
Fig. 7 shows that the total profit of the UAVs decreases
as the cooperation cost among the UAVs increases. When the
cooperation cost is more than or equal to 4, the UAVs prefer
to support the FL training process in the cells individually and
not to form any coalition where UAV 3, UAV 4 and UAV 6
are allocated to Cell 2, Cell 1 and Cell 6 respectively. In other
words, it is not cost-effective for the UAVs to form coalition
anymore. By not forming any coalition, the UAVs are able to
earn a profit of 95.7, which is higher than that if the UAVs
decide to form coalitions when the cooperation cost is more
than or equal to 4.
Furthermore, the total profit earned by the UAVs is also
affected by the number of iterations announced by the model
owner. As the number of iterations required to be completed
by the UAVs increases, the total profit earned by the UAVs
decreases as seen in Fig. 8. Clearly, since the payment price
of the cells of workers does not change and the UAVs incur
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Cooperation Cost
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
To
ta
l S
um
 o
f I
nd
iv
id
ua
l P
ro
fit
s
Total Sum of Individual Profits
Number of Coalitions Formed
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Nu
m
be
r o
f C
oa
lit
io
ns
 F
or
m
ed
Fig. 7. Total Profit and Number of Coalitions vs Cooperation Cost.
20 40 60 80 100
Number of Iterations
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
To
ta
l S
um
 o
f I
nd
iv
id
ua
l P
ro
fit
s
Total Sum of Individual Profits
Maximum Size of Coalitions
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
M
ax
im
um
 S
ize
 o
f C
oa
lit
io
n
Fig. 8. Total Profit and Size of Coalitions vs Number of Iterations.
more energy to facilitate the FL task, the total profit earned
decreases. From Fig. 8, we observe that the maximum size of
coalitions formed is 3 when the number of iterations required
is 50. This implies that by forming a coalition of size 3 and be
allocated to a cell of workers, the UAV coalition is still able to
earn a positive profit. When the number of iterations is 60 to
80, only coalition {1, 6} is allocated to Cell 1 where the profit
decreases as the number of iterations increases. The rest of the
UAVs are allocated to neither Cell 2 nor Cell 3 as the profits
earned by any possible coalitions from supporting any of these
cells are negative. When the number of iterations required by
the FL task is 90, the coalition {1, 3, 6} is allocated to Cell 1.
The UAVs prefer not to support any cell of workers, and thus
there is no need to form a coalition when the number of
iterations is 100. Therefore, a coalition with size of larger than
3 does not form due to two reasons. Firstly, it is possible to
form a smaller coalition to support a cell of workers such that
there is no need for a larger UAV coalition. Secondly, the cost
incurred by a larger UAV coalition is larger than the revenue
gained such that the UAVs are better off not supporting any
cell of workers.
Next, we compare the performance of the proposed joint
auction-coalition formation framework against the existing
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schemes.
E. Comparison with Existing Schemes
For comparison, we have chosen two existing schemes:
(i) the merge-and-split algorithm to determine the formations
of the UAV coalitions with random allocation to the IoV
groups, and (ii) random partitioning of the UAV coalitions with
second-price auction. We have run three rounds of simulations
and the performances of the three schemes are shown in Fig. 9.
The joint auction-coalition formation framework achieves
the highest profit in all three rounds of simulations. Due to
the randomness in either the partitioning or the allocation
of the UAV coalitions, the UAVs are not able to maximize
their profits. On one hand, by adopting the merge-and-split
framework to determine the formations of the UAV coalitions
and randomly allocating the UAV coalitions to the IoV groups,
the profits of the UAV coalitions are not maximized as the
UAV coalitions are not allocated to the IoV groups that value
them most. On the other hand, by randomly deciding on
the partitioning of the UAV coalitions and allocating them
based on the second-price auction, the potential of the UAV
coalitions to earn higher profits is not exploited, which is
achievable by considering other forms of partitioning.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a joint auction-coalition for-
mation framework of UAVs to facilitate resource-constrained
IoV components in completing the FL tasks. Firstly, we design
an auction scheme where each cell of workers submit its bids
to all possible coalitions of UAVs based on their importance
of the cells and the distance between the cells and the UAVs.
Then, we use the merge-and-split algorithm to decide on the
optimal coalitional structure that maximizes the total profit of
the UAVs.
For our future work, we can consider more factors in
determining the coalition formation of UAVs. For example,
we can take into account the social properties of the UAVs
when they form coalitions such that malicious UAVs can
be identified and eliminated so that the FL performance is
not adversely affected. Furthermore, we can consider a joint
trajectory optimization and energy efficient coalition formation
game in order to complete the FL tasks more efficiently.
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